

1 *Manuscript 907*
2 *Received 7 March 2011*
3 *Revised 8 April 2011 and 21 May 2011*

Words 10.012

The Marriage of Psychoanalytic Methodology with the Biosemiotic Agenda

Anna Aragno
140 West End Avenue, 23C
New York, NY, 10023
annaragno@earthlink.net

Abstract

An overview of core phenomena and processes leading to Freud's establishing his psycho-analytic method and early metatheoretical concepts is followed by the author's revision of his topographical model into a seamless biosemiotic theory of mind and human communication. A careful methodological analysis of the semantic/referential scope; speech/listening processes, and semiotic features, of a dialogue designed to make the unconscious conscious, reveals an epistemological bridge between psychoanalytic methodology and the biosemiotic agenda within a unifying interpenetrative paradigm.

Key words: interpenetrative epistemology; emotional-attunement; morphic-sentience.

*What characterizes psycho-analysis as a science is not the material which it handles
but the technique with which it works ... What it aims at and achieves is
nothing other than the uncovering of what is unconscious in mental life*
Freud, 1917, 389

Few are aware that Freud was a research biologist before entering medical neurology. He entered medicine reluctantly. But prodigious observational powers steered him through this uninspired career change inadvertently leading him to uncovering the workings of the human 'Unconscious' and master-minding what became his lifelong passion, psycho-analysis. Thread through his entire opus, however, is an enduring pull to preserving and theoretically knitting together, the biological roots of mental processes, believing that "...in the psychical field, the biological field does in fact play the part of the underlying bedrock" (Freud, 1917, 252).

This paper explores the birth, ascendance, and decline, of this profoundly Freudian agenda illustrating that by updating and revising Freud's first 'topographical' theory of mind the underlying bio-semiotic roots of psychoanalytic metatheory re-emerge and are revitalized. With the help of interdisciplinary knowledge culled from the neuro- and cognitive-sciences, early development, semiotics, linguistics, and dialogics, in two works, I undertook an examination and reappraisal of the semantic and semiotic features, the listening and speech patterns, progressive stages and phases of a dialogue designed to make the unconscious conscious. Subjecting our "method" and its processes to a methodological analysis revealed that Freud's scientific methodology is complementary to, and concordant with, the Biosemiotic agenda.

In a previous communication I presented an overview of the history of "Metapsychology", Freud's core scientific framework; its problematic "physicalist" analogies, subsequent descent and demise, and my own investment in updating its central tenets in a revised biosemiotic model of mind and communication (Aragno 1997, 2008). In the interest of space, here, I briefly summarize the essence of these revisions in order to focus on our methodology, its special features and broader scientific implications, especially in relation to how these may converge with the scope and ambitions of Biosemiotics.

55 Preliminary Communication (1893) - Psychological Mechanisms of Hysterical Phenomena

56
57 Psycho-analysis was born at the bedside of a young girl suffering from severe hysterical paralysis, an
58 inability to swallow, amnesia, and an irrepressible urge to recount her evening “stories,” but only in English,
59 not her native German. It was through *listening* to Anna O’s stream of evening narrations, jokingly referred
60 to as “chimney sweeping,” more seriously as her ‘talking cure,’ and watching, as one by one her core
61 symptoms dropped away, that Freud (and Breuer, 1883-85) presented the first etiological theory of
62 “psychoneurosis,’ unconscious determinants in hysteria and the value of ‘abreaction,’ announcing to the
63 world, ‘hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences’. ‘Psychogenic’ meant that symptoms were ‘mind-made,’
64 their hidden meanings expressed through diverse physical, emotional, and behavioural, channels. The
65 fundamentals of a set of therapeutic principles laid down, Freud proceeded to practice his “method” on patients
66 seeking relief from an array of symptoms all of which released their unconscious meanings through analysis,
67 dissolving as their affective-charge was gradually ‘worked-through.’
68

70 The Interpretation of Dreams (1900)

71
72 *Biologically dream-life seems to me to proceed directly from the residues of the prehistoric stage of life*
73 *(one to three years), which is the source of the unconscious and alone contains the aetiology of the*
74 *psychoneuroses: the stage which is normally obscured by an amnesia similar to hysteria...*

75 Freud, letter to Fliess, March 10th, 1898
76

77 By 1900 Freud had uncovered a latent/manifest structure in dreams, deciphered the primary process syntax
78 and grammar of their pictorial-meaning representations, and devised a ‘technique’ of dream
79 interpretation within a first ‘topographical’ theory of mind. “The Interpretation of Dreams” (1900) is a work
80 of such bountiful inspiration that he himself recognized such insights visit but once in a lifetime. The
81 groundbreaking novelties of this work cluster around chapters six and seven, wherein Freud integrated the
82 two principles of mental functioning, the Primary and Secondary processes, with the three *Systems* of his
83 “Topographical” model, Ucs. Pc. Cs (unconscious, pre-conscious, conscious). Together with dynamic
84 repression, these core precepts represent the *foundational theoretical principles* of early psychoanalysis.

85 Freud took on the unprecedented task of “investigating the relations between the manifest content of
86 dreams and the latent dream-thoughts and of tracing out the processes by which the latter have been changed
87 into the former” (Freud, 1900, 277). He found that the dream’s core thoughts are transformed into dream
88 narratives by a “highly complicated activity of the mind” (122) and his analysis of its component mechanisms
89 yielded the following structure: “The dream-thoughts and dream-content are presented to us like two versions of
90 the same subject-matter in two different languages. More properly, the dream-content seems like a transcript of
91 the dream thoughts into another mode of expression...” (277). This transformation is effectuated by four primary
92 processes, i) **condensation** (dreams are a mass of such compositions), ii); **displacement**, iii); **means of**
93 **representation** (considerations of representability) ie., by idiosyncratic or universal symbols, analogy,
94 parody, *pars pro toto*, reversals, all kinds of embodied, dimensional, and architectural metaphors, (“as if,” “if
95 then,” relations); and, iv) **secondary revision**, a semblance of narrative form or “sense-making” evincing the
96 infiltration of ordering and sequencing habits belonging to conscious modes of thought. Together these create
97 the characteristically bizarre, phenomenalist quality of dream imagery. We ought not confuse manifest with
98 latent content for in so doing we would miss the entire process of the ‘dream-work’, the fundamental
99 unconscious ‘labour’ of the mind. And, Freud recommended that we not underestimate a contribution to the
100 ‘dream-thoughts’ of infantile/childhood experiences: the reappearance of the past in “sensory images” (547) is
101 understood as the day residue functioning as a trigger-stimulus – a metonymic hook – connecting early,
102 emotionally charged memories with current impressions which conflate past with present. Dreams may also
103 substitute for ‘remembering’ by reproducing infantile scenes that have been “*modified by being transferred on to*
104 *a recent experience*” (Freud 1900.546) pointing to the ‘transfer’ basis of dream structure.

105 Of central importance to the ensuing discussion of my biosemiotic revisions is an understanding that
106 Freud’s dynamic “psychical apparatus” at this time has fundamental ‘directional’ excitatory qualities
107 (adopted conceptually from ‘neurology’) and quantities of ‘energy’ expenditure that change forms, as
108 operative principles. Key characteristics of the ‘two principles of mental functioning’ are; the Primary
109 process (*Ucs*) operates via the most expedient path to ‘wish fulfilment’ with unbound, loose and mobile
110 energy, its modes are idiosyncratic, free and irrational, knowing no time, logic, or negation; while the

111 Secondary process (*Cs*) operates with delays, reality constraints, accordingly, with ‘bound’ energy cathexis
 112 (attention), is linear, sequential, reasonable, equipped with verbal ‘signs’ through which to specify
 113 conventional meanings. The former faces inward, the latter outward.

114 An important feature of this early *Ucs- Pcs-Cs* general model of mind is its implied epigenetic structure
 115 and propensity to “regression” toward the lower end, detaching from ‘reality’ in psychosis, returning to an
 116 ‘earlier mode of thought,’ normally, in the dream. The dream, then, is constructed out of mental ‘work’ *as*
 117 *well as* a turning back of an “idea” into sensory pictographic script, so that, “In regression the fabric of the
 118 dream-thoughts is resolved into its raw material” (Freud, 1900, 543). Three distinct forms of regression are
 119 identified: a) *topographical*; b) *temporal*; and; c) *formal*, whereby “primitive” (iconic) modes of expression
 120 take the place of usual ones. These typically occur conjointly since what is older in time is more primitive in
 121 form and topographically lies closer to the perceptual end (1900, 548). Topography is *not* to be taken
 122 literally, however, having nothing to do with anatomy but referring to “regions in the *mental apparatus*
 123 wherever they may be” (Freud 1915, 175). It will be for Piaget to identify that the first “sensory-motor” stage
 124 in cognitive development is indeed actualized in the *moving body*.

125 The psychoanalytic technique of dream interpretation came out of Freud’s first ‘direct viewing’ of
 126 unconscious processes, hence; “*The interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious*
 127 *activities of the mind*” (1900, 608). And although he acknowledged having crafted only a crude, preliminary and
 128 speculative model of psychical functioning, this much, he wrote, was fact: primary processes are present from
 129 the beginning, representing the core of our being, while secondary processes overlay the primary only
 130 gradually over the course of development. His enduring confidence in his understanding of dream structure,
 131 and of its value as an instrument of research, prompted him to write, “psychoanalysis may claim a high place
 132 among the sciences concerned with the earliest most obscure periods of the beginnings of mind” (548- 49).

133 Though few psychoanalysts still preserve the art of dream interpretation as an integral part of their
 134 practice fewer still are interested in using either the dream or Freud’s first model of mind as templates for
 135 metatheoretical advance. Nevertheless, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of the dream in
 136 psychoanalysis: a centrepiece of our theory of mind, it is to us what the telescope was to Galileo.

137

138 **The Technique of Freud’s Psycho-Analytic Method**

139

140 *One of the claims of psycho-analysis...is that in its execution research and treatment coincide:*
 141 *nevertheless, after a certain point, the technique required for one opposes that required for the other.*

142

Freud, 1912,114

143

144 Between 1912-14 Freud published a series of “Papers on Technique” couched as undogmatic
 145 “recommendations” to practicing analysts. Reticent to systematizing his “technique” Freud formalized the
 146 dialogue around serving the specific goals of investigating and interpreting the unconscious. To these ends he
 147 devised a specialized “free associating” speech-form matched by a loose, “evenly suspended” attentional stance
 148 (Freud, 1912, 111) that, together, generate a bi-directional ‘semantic/psychical field’ of mutual influence. In
 149 order to register, hear, and interpret another’s unconsciously transmitted *meanings* -- using oneself “as an
 150 instrument in the analysis”(Freud, 1912, 116) — one has to employ one’s own unconscious without unbidden
 151 personal intrusions. Freud put this into a formula; the analyst “must turn his own unconscious like a receptive
 152 organ toward the transmitting unconscious of the patient” (115).

153 Recognizing the requirements and dangers of a method that instigated, isolated, and made use of a potentially
 154 explosive human situation, all of Freud’s technical rules were designed to optimize its instrumentality and
 155 minimize its pitfalls. The dialogue and the analyst’s functioning in it are both vehicles of psychoanalytic
 156 methodology: implicit in this instrumentation is the idea of empathic attunement. The fundamental rule for
 157 analysts is to ‘say everything that comes to mind without censorship;’ the matching rule for the listening
 158 analyst, to withhold all conscious influence and give equal notice to everything without selection or judgment, to
 159 “Simply listen”!...not bothering to try to keep anything in mind (112) while “swinging over, according to need,
 160 from one mental attitude to another” (114). In order to prevent injecting personal meanings, sentiments, or
 161 judgments into this interpsychical field Freud advocated receptivity “like a telephone receiver” (115) while
 162 remaining opaque like a “mirror” (118) (reflecting back only what is shown) and modelling oneself on the
 163 surgeon (115), putting aside all “human sympathy” to focus on performing the interpretive tasks at hand.

164 Freud was offering his own way of ‘becoming an instrument in the analysis,’ an observational stance of
 165 objective sensitivity, in which one must be highly attuned while scrupulously avoiding personal intrusions
 166 into a communicative field in which listening means deriving *from*, not imposing *onto*. For those of us with an

167 eye to epistemology this hands-off unprejudicial stance illuminates an important truism; ‘how you listen
 168 determines what you will hear,’ which may be extended to ‘how you observe determines what you will see’.
 169 Freud’s principal methodological concern was to make sure that neither member of the dyad introduced
 170 obstructions to the establishment of the free flow of communications passing between them. Aware of the bi-
 171 directional power of this new force-field he advocated analytic neutrality and abstinence as technical necessities.
 172 The wisdom in providing a stance with these built-in safeguards comes from recognizing the ability of
 173 unconscious agendas to override “restraint” but also to guarantee ‘symbolic’ reflectiveness. In providing loose
 174 guidelines for *how* but not really *what* to do his technical papers address relationships between enacting,
 175 representing and working-through, an interplay of narrative modes the analysand will move through, and the
 176 analyst will use, in the development and use of the transference. Above all he stressed the importance of
 177 establishing the “proper rapport” (Freud, 1913, 139); “It remains the first aim of the treatment to attach the
 178 analysand to the analyst and the process... It is certainly possible to forfeit this first success if from the start one
 179 takes up any standpoint other than one of empathic understanding...” (140). This personal instrumentation *used*
 180 *methodologically* has led to unforeseeable new depths in identifying Ucs process/phenomena.

181 The principal interpretive referents of Freud’s unconscious came into sharp relief through the activation of a
 182 clearly circumscribed new version of an old story, ‘the transference neurosis’ of the classical model. A clinical
 183 process is defined as “psychoanalytic” insofar as it adheres to the two shibboleths of the psychoanalytic method,
 184 the analysis of transference and resistance. The methodological precision, and coherence of this core dialogue,
 185 out of which so many variant genres have sprung remains unmatched. Insight into *psychical* reality is the
 186 singular psychoanalytic form of knowledge obtained through clinical analysis, and *working-through*, the crucial
 187 intermediary stage in an otherwise unremarkable semiotic progression — identifying-naming-working-through-
 188 insight — that is initially divided between two dialogical lines in a continuous contrapuntal duet. The defining
 189 feature of psychoanalytic insight is that it cannot be given, it must be earned; hence, while this painful, slow,
 190 laborious integrative effort cannot be bypassed, it leaves deep and lasting gains.

191

192

193 **Papers on Metapsychology (1915)**

194

195

I am continually occupied with psychology — it is really metapsychology.

196

Freud, Letter to Fliess, Feb. 13th, 1896, p157

197

198 Fifteen years since Freud had presented his first major theoretical exposition, and over twenty since he had
 199 been practicing his ‘method,’ by 1915 he was ready to write a series of interconnected papers centering on
 200 the cohesive meta-theoretical framework he had conjured. “Papers on Metapsychology” (1915-17) are a *tour*
 201 *de force* of conceptual integration, summarizing all of his observations, conjectures, and theoretical
 202 constructs, pulled together as “temporary scaffolding” toward the development of a scientific psychology.
 203 Written in just a few months, of the original twelve, only five were ever found or published. They
 204 demonstrate Freud’s ability to extrapolate from the particular to the general; take empirical observation and
 205 abstract to metatheory; look behind ontogeny and see the childhood of the species; seek psychological
 206 answers in biological origins. In this Lamarckian-biogenetic framework Freud sharpens his theories of
 207 primal-organic and dynamic repression tying these to an innate, biological predisposition toward
 208 topographical regression -- as in dreams. These papers abound in references to the biological underpinnings
 209 of motivation and mentation, aiming at considering “mental life from a *biological* point of view”.... (1915,
 210 121) while making use of “the concept of purpose...” (120). Striving to link body and mind included efforts
 211 to articulate the pivotal role of language in transforming unconscious to conscious. Unfortunately, Freud was
 212 obliged to construct a theoretical framework *without an available conceptual vocabulary* for the semiotic
 213 and discourse process-phenomena his method had unveiled.

214 The centrepiece of these papers is undoubtedly, “The Unconscious,” (1915), where Freud still feels he
 215 must “justify” the concept citing different mental processes that are completely disconnected from each other
 216 (“an idea may exist simultaneously in two places, or forms, in the mental apparatus.”175) Stressing the
 217 hierarchy of psychical systems in this *Topographical* point of view (172) Freud here details the dynamics of
 218 Repression, the special characteristics of the System *Ucs*, commenting on the remarkable bi-directional
 219 ability of one person’s *Ucs* to impact on another’s “without passing through the *Cs*” (194) and
 220 communication between the two systems, a topic of lasting concern to him. This *topography* of psychical
 221 systems underpins the conceptual unity of Freud’s first *general* model of mind.

222 Specifically it is the translation from *Ucs* to *Pcs* – from primary to secondary process *modes of thought*
 223 that Freud most wanted to understand. Given the difficulties observed clinically in making the unconscious
 224 conscious Freud presented this struggle in the part-anthropomorphic part-physicalist embattled metaphors of
 225 force/counterforce; of breaking- and working-through resistances and defences, as a ‘censor’ must be
 226 overcome to loosen repression and ‘words’ attach themselves to the ‘thing-’presentations of the *Ucs*. It was
 227 apparent that language is the indispensable instrument for the transition from *Ucs* to *Pcs*, hence “...the
 228 conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to
 229 it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone” (1915, 201). This, however, is
 230 still insufficient for *Cs awareness*, for which an additional ‘quotient’ of energy-attention is required. How
 231 this transition comes about he described in terms of shifts in forms of energy: from free to increasingly
 232 bound and delayed - hence the quantitative ‘economics’ of the whole works. The restraining effect of *Pcs-Cs*
 233 thought, an “...inhibition of the tendency of cathected ideas toward discharge” (1915, 188) validated clinical
 234 evidence that linguistic analysis and verbal expression -- by inducing *thought* -- counteract a compulsion to
 235 ‘repeat’. But Freud’s keen attempts to understand what are clearly semiotic processes of linguistic and
 236 discourse-reference, were depicted through quantitative factors in a 19th century physio-alchemical analogy.

237 This notwithstanding, it is specifically this distinction between primary and secondary process *modes of*
 238 *thought*, and the *transition* between the two obtained by his method, that Freud considered his deepest
 239 insight, though still mysterious; Freud had inadvertently uncovered underlying epistemological processes of
 240 *signification and their transpositions in form*. Yet topography, structure, invested and expended quantities of
 241 energy fuelling forces and counter-forces, were the only concepts available then to articulate a theoretical
 242 vision ahead of its time. The transformation of “unconscious to conscious” was couched in principles of
 243 Newtonian physics with a malleable “energy” providing the crucial currency through which the ‘economy’
 244 of the system’s fusions and transmutations occur. It is the indispensable metaphor for “trans-formation”.

245 Thus Freud presented a cohesive ‘meta-psychological’ framework for the findings of his psycho-analytic
 246 method, by now three things in one; a mode of therapy; a research method; and a theory of mind.
 247 Recognizing for the first time that his methodology required more than one explanatory ‘point of view’ he
 248 proposed that “... when we have succeeded in describing a psychological process in its dynamic, topographical
 249 and economic aspects, we should speak of it as a *metapsychological* presentation”(1915,181). His
 250 methodology, in fact, yields a ‘polyperspectival’ science of universal value, to which the next generation of
 251 theoreticians will add the ‘genetic’ and ‘adaptive’ points of view making a total of five metapsychological
 252 dimensions. (I have since proposed the ‘morphological’ to replace the ‘economic’).

253 Despite the magnitude of insights, new distinctions and groundbreaking observations contained in his
 254 findings, Freud’s opens these papers tentatively, apologetically even, for the ‘indefiniteness’ of his
 255 articulations, at pains to inform that he can only refer conjecturally, via abstractions, to observations for
 256 which there were no known explanations. Fully cognizant that these were but preliminary mappings, Freud
 257 gave free rein to speculative hypotheses deliberately avoiding the mistake of confusing the scaffolding for
 258 the building (1900, 536). Bitterness at the limitations of the *Weltanschauung* of his era was tempered by
 259 recommendations that those who followed should update his preliminary formulations as new knowledge
 260 became available.

261

262

263 **Rise of Ego Psychology, Demise of Metapsychology, and the Dispersion of a Method.**

264

265 *...there has not been, since Freud’s time, a single advance in the investigative or research*
 266 *methodology used by psychoanalysis – not one advance in studying psychoanalytic protocols?*

267

G. Klein 1976, 64

268

269 Neither the status of knowledge nor the scientific paradigm of Freud’s era could provide explanatory
 270 principles for a science of signals, signs, symbols, and symptoms that pointed to meanings invisible to the
 271 naked eye. The fields of early development, neurobiology, emotions, semiotics, linguistics, and dialogics
 272 would burgeon soon after Freud’s death so he left a huge gap between observation and explanatory
 273 hypotheses. Nowhere was that schism wider than between metapsychology and the *practice* of a talking
 274 therapy. Would that later generations of analysts had had the conceptual wisdom to revisit core concepts in
 275 light of new knowledge and proceed where Freud left off. But the next chapter in the evolution of the
 276 psychoanalytic method would not proceed in the direction he hoped.

277 On the heels of Freud's death the winds of change were already blowing from dissenting schools in
 278 England and America that focused on interpersonal, *relational* aspects of the clinical dyad, bypassing the
 279 whole problem of a 'general' explanatory framework altogether. Freud's far flung metaphors and analogies
 280 did not go down well with those who argued that people are motivated by relationships, not instincts, and
 281 who focused on personality and clinical concerns.

282 Freud's immediate followers, the great crop of Ego Psychologists, continued to advance his core
 283 Structural Theory (1923), in a dynamic framework, honouring all metapsychological requirements. But
 284 opposing tendencies brewing from within were about to pull psychoanalysis apart creating a deep rift
 285 between Hermeneuticists and hard scientists, who saw no future in fictional forces, systems, censors, and
 286 shifting energies, eventually embracing a clinical psychoanalysis of many "schools". Out went Freud's
 287 whole biological substrate, his layered *Systems*, cohesive framework, and complex dynamics of
 288 interconnecting linguistic pathways from an unruly unconscious to conscious awareness.

289 By the late eighties the field had fragmented into many clinical clans each of which slightly altered the
 290 analytic stance, adjusting clinical technique to advance some particular area of clinical acumen. So, *clinical*
 291 psychoanalysis grew, mushrooming as a popular 'therapeia'. In just a few decades, the entire
 292 "metatheoretical" framework Freud had constructed around his first general theory of mind, the most
 293 cherished potentially '*scientific*' core of his early opus, had been discarded and any interest pertaining to its
 294 tenets completely abandoned.

295 Yet already in 1944, Rapaport (one of the great theoretical minds of Ego psychology) had pointed to the
 296 necessity of subjecting psychoanalysis to a methodological analysis. "It is very difficult to treat the
 297 methodology of something which is three things," wrote Rapaport, (68) believing this analysis to be
 298 indispensable for the advancement of a really systematic psychoanalytic psychology. Rapaport realized that first
 299 and foremost we would have to distinguish between those phenomena that can be systematized and those that
 300 cannot: "Methodological treatment of something means that you investigate what consequences adopting this
 301 method has for the material to be obtained and what kind of consequences it has for the theory that must be built
 302 to encompass, to make understandable, to unify these observations" (1944,171). Questions wavered between the
 303 epistemological and methodological because psychoanalysis implicates both. If we ask, then, simply: How does
 304 it inform? (an epistemological question) answers point to methodological features; an expanded,
 305 multidimensional interpretive semantic; purposeful discourse situations guided by the mutual fit between a free-
 306 associative speech form, a loose, attuned, participant-attentional stance; and a supraordinate investigative goal,
 307 "...nothing other than the uncovering of what is unconscious in mental life (Freud, 1917, 389).

308 But no such methodological analysis was undertaken, nor were Rapaport's or Freud's vision of a
 309 scientific metapsychology pursued in mainstream psychoanalysis until this author began investigating the
 310 "mind's work" in contemporary terms, revisiting the implications of Freud's early observations and general
 311 theory of mind. The remainder of this essay will address how, in total isolation, I approached investigating
 312 our methodology with respect to Freud's statement that the science of psychoanalysis is not in the material
 313 with which it deals (or its interlocutors) but in *the way it works*. Where the revisions took me and how these
 314 led to Biosemiotics follow. I begin with a brief situational analysis of our methodology

315

316

317 **Methodological Reflections**

318

319 *The human being has the peculiar quality of being able to observe himself and then bend back upon*
 320 *his observations and make a theory. He can explore observations..., and make theories about that.*
 321 *...But the coin has another side; it has to do with methodology. The bending back of science upon itself*
 322 *to see scientific interrelationships between its own constructs and theories — that is methodology.*

323 D. Rapaport, 1944, 172

324

325 We know, because Freud left ample documentation, that 'psychoanalysis' sprung from his own
 326 observational/listening stance and passionate interest in the unconscious. He arrived at his hypotheses through an
 327 integration of clinical observations, his auto-analysis, and the interpretation of various unconsciously determined
 328 universal phenomena. At the genesis of this new science Freud was authoring works at an astounding rate,
 329 corresponding with Fliess, dialoguing with those who formed a movement around him. His ideas began creating
 330 a pool of 'referents' for a growing body of experiential-research and theoretical hypotheses that rapidly
 331 generated a 'discourse-semantic' through which further articulation of new findings took place. The

332 objectification of psycho-analytic data occurred by means of this threefold process and the inherent three-
 333 pronged span of his investigative approach expanded Freud's meta-theoretical goals.

334 These three investigative orientations are guided by different sets of referents, addressing different facets of
 335 the discourse process/phenomena, at different levels of abstraction. The consequence of an investigative method
 336 with diverse perspectives is a context with different interpretive goals; i) to interpret the personal unconscious for
 337 therapeutic insight; ii) to isolate unconscious processes and phenomena; and iii) to understand the
 338 transformational principles of mental functioning along an unconscious/conscious dimension. But herein lie
 339 some of the key problems: we are dealing with three entirely different categories of phenomena, *psychological*,
 340 *epistemological* and *logical*, each operating according to different sets of principles converging in the events of
 341 one dialogue.

342 Psychological issues are probably best understood along various developmental and diagnostic dimensions;
 343 epistemological questions have to do with how we 'know'; but, even when articulated along developmental lines
 344 (Aragno, 1997) semiotic principles of symbolization are logical — and logic is of the mind. These principles are
 345 not *directly* observable, yet they underlie not only *how* the method works but *how we organize experience and*
 346 *knowledge and by what means these organizations change*. What transpires in psychoanalytic contexts reflects
 347 the practical application of operative *principles* underlying these three classes of phenomena. My interests
 348 swayed toward epistemological, phenomenological, and phylogenetic dimensions, an inquiry that led to logical
 349 developmental principles of symbolization.

350 Insofar as our primary goal is to make knowable what is unconscious, a little appreciated attribute of the
 351 method is its ability to uncover processes underlying our modes of apperception, or *ways* of knowing,
 352 themselves. In addition to peering into the recesses of human nature the method traces modes of experience
 353 through represented and *pre*-representational manifestations. Rapaport (1944) understood the broader
 354 implication of this window into epistemology; "The claims of psychoanalysis are so enormous that they include
 355 scrutiny of any kind of methodology, because any person who thinks about methodology does so with his
 356 psyche....You are dealing with a science which claims that it can bend back upon any kind of science or thought
 357 product" (179)

358 What is handed down, more valuable even than the 'talking cure,' is Freud's own way of coming-to-
 359 know, his 'methodological' stance, which generated the *method* itself and its scope of inquiry, and is therefore
 360 "simultaneously prerequisite and product, the tool and the result of the study" (Vygotsky, 1978, 65). Insight into
 361 '*psychical*' reality is the new dimension gained by this methodology: the reality of primary-process experience,
 362 prior to, and always underlying, more differentiated Cs experience mediated by socialization and conventional
 363 linguistic signifiers.

364 The success of the method may be measured in part by its increasingly widened scope of interpretable,
 365 unconscious referents, sinking practically to proto-semiotic, biological levels of expression. Yet this is precisely
 366 what psychoanalysis has always asserted in its second, fundamental hypothesis, "It explains the supposedly
 367 somatic concomitant phenomena as being what is truly psychical, and thus, in the first instance disregards the
 368 quality of consciousness" (Freud, 1940, 158). Freud's method harnesses for apperceptual purposes virtually all
 369 sense-modalities in an integrative fusion of feeling and intellect, emotional resonance and discursive thought,
 370 observation-introspection and theoretical abstraction, all funnelled through the interpretive focus of the
 371 situational purpose. This is because responsiveness of the *whole* organism is necessary to access the range of
 372 interactive channels this discourse reopens.

373 One cannot but marvel at Freud's modernity in crafting a curative conversation that adopts only language as
 374 its instrument, or at the radical boundary-altering stance between 'observer' and 'observed' that uncovering the
 375 Ucs requires. The injunction to the listening analyst is to *bend* his/her unconscious toward that of the other,
 376 implicitly opening deeper channels of interaction. Striking, in particular, are; a) Freud's willingness to become
 377 part of the investigative field, making participant-observation central to the interpretive task; b) his
 378 multidimensionality of viewpoints, both metatheoretically and interpretively, using dynamisms in the contextual
 379 process from different perspectives simultaneously; c) his adoption of multiple modes of apprehension —
 380 introspection, empathy, listening, observing, thinking and feeling — in an integrative objectification of
 381 subjective observations and experience; d) his implicit use of the dialectical dimension, emphasized by Dilthey
 382 (1883/1911) as fundamental to human understanding, adopting the bi-directional reflexivity of reference on
 383 which the collaborative work depends; e) Freud's incorporating the above features of his investigative style,
 384 moulding them into a comprehensive, interpretive methodology for studying the human mind; and finally, f) his
 385 steadfast conviction of the *scientific* value and potential of this new methodology with respect to its generativity
 386 and universal applicability.

387

388 **Somatopsyche: The Body in Language and Discourse**

389

390 *We must be prepared...to assume the existence...not only of a second unconscious, but of a third, fourth,*
 391 *perhaps of an unlimited number of states of consciousness, all unknown to us and to one another.*

392

Freud, 1915, 170

393

394 With ample corroboration from neuroscience it is now commonly accepted that emotion and reason, affect
 395 and cognition, are intimately connected. As biological gateways to an organism's internal state and our
 396 primary mode of communication, taking the modulation of natural affect-expressions by signs and the
 397 mediation of communication by language as the central operative functions in mental development continues
 398 a paradigm shift begun in 'Symbolization'(Aragno 1997) developed more fully in 'Forms of Knowledge'
 399 (2008). Freud's topographical model became a seamless biosemiotic continuum beginning in biological
 400 signals which are gradually mediated during socialization by gestural, behavioural, and linguistic signs,
 401 gradually generating, through discourse, full symbolic functional organization.

402

403 I view eight primary affects (phylogenetically programmed, hard-wired) as basic templates for
 404 subsequent differentiated meaning-forms, as prime movers and motivators in humans, originators of
 405 impulse/defence and adaptive or maladaptive compromises, because in humans impulses are rapidly overlaid
 406 by internalizations and *meanings* – and all *meanings* imply processes of *signification*. This fundamental
 407 premise, the early interpolation of the sign over the signal, becomes the basis for an entirely different way of
 408 approaching and understanding the developmental vicissitudes of the human psyche. Placing 'affects' at the
 409 fulcrum brings communication and mind in line with organismic/psychic functioning. Moreover, it
 410 encompasses in one system of ideas principles of psychical development and integration, and the mediating
 411 speech processes by which psychoanalytic discourse makes conscious the unconscious, thereby integrating
 the practice of the method with its metatheoretical base.

412

413 In 'Symbolization,' (Aragno, 1997) the concept of a layered or stratified psyche is expressed in an
 414 epigenetic, hierarchic, developmental model of semiotic mediation that moves from natural signals through
 415 acquired signs to symbols. The semiotic function is viewed as an inherited hominid trait, originating in the
 416 body, gradually evolved to interweave with cerebral areas predisposed toward representing experience in
 417 ever more expedient ways; slowly developing signs to record, and language to name, point out, refer to,
 418 categorize, conceptualize, and communicate *complex meanings*, as no other species can. I make a clear
 419 distinction between the given biological 'signal,' a natural mode of communication shared with higher
 420 primates and other species, and the discrete systems of signs and symbols which, due to our cerebral
 421 architecture, provide semiotic means which come to dominate communication, behaviour, and experience in
 422 many different ways. Important points regarding this model are; i) each of these discrete semiotic functional-
 423 forms results in dramatic shifts in subjective experience, motivation, thought, and meaning-organization; ii)
 424 advances in semiotic organization and functioning are contingent on, as well as generating, increased
 425 cognitive distinctions implying *adequate* intrapsychic separation and differentiation; iii) these semiotic
 426 forms intermingle in everyday communication, thought, and experience; and iv) pre-, or proto-semiotic
 427 modes, *particularly at least differentiated levels of regressed, reverie, or psychotic, states*, induce *powerful*
 bi-directional impact in human interactions.

428

429 In this epigenetic continuum stages are not fixed and definitively arrived at but discrete *functional forms*
 430 designating planes of mental organization (often subject-specific) that tend to crystallize favouring higher
 431 modes yet intermingle all the time and remain subject to regression. Seeds of signification have germinated
 432 long before the first words are uttered; precursors of verbal signification are inherent in the human
 433 disposition for dynamic schematization in pattern-matching, representation, memory, mimicry, imitation, and
 434 emotional-attunement. Although language is by no means the only or even the best vocabulary through
 435 which to translate myriad *qualities* of human experience, for which music and art are far better suited, it is
 the semiotic system that provides denotive signs specific and efficient enough to bridge our separateness,
 436 enabling us to communicate expediently and in exchanges that lead to conscious awareness.

437

438 'Forms of Knowledge' (Aragno, 2008) greatly expands this model's underlying principles through a
 439 comprehensive study of proto- and semiotic communicative modes via the analysis of the semantic reference
 440 and speech-processes of our specialized dialogues and unique phenomena aroused therein. Human
 441 communication in its *totality* becomes an empirical window into the many intrapsychic and interactive pre-
 442 and proto-semiotic processes we refer to under the broad term, the 'unconscious.' My inquiry addressed all
 443 interactional phenomena bi-directionally and *in process*, reconstituting semiotic activities that first capture,
 construct, and then crystallize linguistically created realities, pushing the unwordable, unthinkable, or

444 unacceptable, out. The study began from the premise that since many unconscious meanings are rooted in,
 445 and expressed *through the body*, forms of human expression and communication from an organismic
 446 standpoint offer the best empirical viewing of ‘psyche’ for the study of mind. A psychoanalytic study of
 447 communication becomes a vehicle for observing how humans register, transmit, and communicate what is *in*
 448 and *on* their minds; what they project and induce unconsciously in others; the nature of internalization,
 449 transference, empathy, and the interweaving of enactment and recall in the current presence of the past.
 450 Simply put: I was interested in what happens *between* interlocutors, in identifying and differentiating the *forms*
 451 of interactions themselves; in laying the groundwork for a systematic study of their logical forms.

452 This was therefore a multidimensional study filtered through the unifying template of a bio-semiotic
 453 model of mind leading into the complex polysemic domain of meanings, forms of reference, and sources of
 454 “gnosis” in the sense of knowing *prior* to the adoption of conventional signs. In psychical terms semiotic
 455 *functional-forms* reveal *how* something is currently experienced or known. This functional role of form in
 456 subjective experience stands out when considering the dynamic interaction of many unconscious elements in
 457 relation to a whole, like a composition: *Transpositions in form lead to functional re-organization*.
 458 Examination of interrelationships between function, form, and content through time, then, yields a theoretical
 459 template for the architecture, or grammar, of human meanings which, in the book, is represented
 460 metaphorically by the analogue of an orchestral score. A preoccupation with feelings, meanings, and form,
 461 threads through the entire work anchoring psychological manifestations in natural biological roots.

462 With an interpretive focus on *everything* unconscious, psychoanalytic situations create ‘semantic fields,’
 463 ‘bio-semio-spheres’ of considerable multi-directional influence, wherein internalized interpersonal dynamics
 464 are transferred; imagistic patterns are inductively transmitted; and Ucs feelings, dreams, and fantasies,
 465 permeate the situation and those in it. Under the general rubric “Morphic Sentience,’ several distinct
 466 unconscious forms are posited and named. Although superficially superseded by linguistic communication,
 467 these deep bio-psycho-social strata remain vitally active registering tonal nuances, intent, and unconscious
 468 dynamic/emotional dispositions, continuing to play a critical role in all interactions. Placing affects at the
 469 core of human intercourse provides an organic base for a comprehensive overview of the morphogenesis of
 470 human meanings, interactive modes (Aragno, 2008), possibly the origins of ‘representation’ itself (Aragno,
 471 2011).

472 All at once I found that we have been embedded in a methodology that is also an *interpenetrative*
 473 *epistemology*, a dialectical process that uncovers *how* we come to know. The yields of its inquiries bifurcate
 474 into branches each expanding human consciousness in different ways: one, via analysis of the personal
 475 unconscious, leads to therapeutic insight, the other, displays microgenetic mediations in the transformation
 476 of *undifferentiated* experience into increasingly differentiated, verbally referenced ideation. Virtually
 477 *everything* that transpires in our semantic fields is taken as an index, or pattern of unconscious meaning, and
 478 many of these indices are expressed somatically, induced as moods, feelings, projected, pictured, conveyed
 479 metaphorically, enacted in contextual replays, or acted-out in life. This new *interpenetrative epistemology*
 480 instrumentalizes human responsiveness *in its totality* because methodologically it generates a ‘bio-semiosphere’
 481 of proto-semiotic forms of interaction that appear interspersed among narrative lines in manifestations that
 482 *exhibit, illustrate, relive, and re-enact*, past experiences.

483 Psychoanalytic phenomena are pluralistic, multidimensional, each dimension contributing its own facet of
 484 inquiry, revealing its own developmental line, according to its own operative principles. By revising Freud’s
 485 *first* general model of mind I had returned to its profoundly biological roots and amplitude of applicability.
 486 In fact this developmental continuum is remarkable for its generativity and explanatory power. Whether
 487 conceptualized as an epigenetic hierarchy or a biosemiotic continuum of increasingly mediated
 488 organizations, this revised framework mirrors the evolutionary accretion of cerebral cortices layering over
 489 core brainstem and limbic systems enabling us to trace progressions in types of consciousness over
 490 millennia; in normal development; in microgenetic steps in phases of treatment; in the disintegrative impact
 491 on the semiotic function of overwhelming anxiety; and in the dissolution of its structuring in psychotic
 492 regression.

493 The model is corroborated by interdisciplinary knowledge of attachment, development, cognition,
 494 dialogics, group processes, and literature on aesthetics and art; in particular it is undergirded by cutting edge
 495 neuro-scientific research (Damasio,1999) on different levels and states of consciousness providing a neuro-
 496 epigenetic map that invites reconsideration of phenomena uncovered by the early Freud. From these
 497 refurbished foundations one may revisit key components of unconscious processes uncovered by our
 498 methodology none of which is more outstanding for the study of signification than our royal road to the Ucs,
 499 the dream.

500 Without the deterministic, causal requirement of Freud's day, the dream appears quite simply to be
 501 another 'way of thinking'. Uncovering its overall *metaphoric* (Aragno 2009) structure, and deciphering its
 502 pictured-trope meaning-code uncovers a general schema for a unitary somato-psychic continuum, a dynamic
 503 trajectory of iconic then linguistically translated representations by means of which *body* becomes *mind*.
 504 The functional processes of *figurative* signification composing the dream's elements reveal Freud's 'dream-
 505 work' to be *proto-semiotic* processes representing experience in antecedent stages that prefigure the
 506 formation of linguistic tropes. We would not presume the mind's 'work' to be an empty exercise: yet a "mode
 507 of thought" is not a force or a motive, but a function of how the human nervous system and brain 'work'. What
 508 was viewed as a *topographical regression* now looks more like a glimpse into an evolutionary *progression*.

509 I took note of Freud's discrete but incisive plaint introducing the second edition of the Dream book (1908)
 510 against those who had "evidently failed to notice that we have something here from which a number of
 511 inferences can be drawn that are bound to transform our psychological theories."(xxi), and drew inferences
 512 yielding two propositions: if the representational trajectory in the dream exhibits *natural* functional processes
 513 in a body/mind continuum, i) it must have a traceable phylo- and onto-genetic line, which, ii) would be
 514 applicable to a variety of semiotic media. While dreams are considered formally regressive, they are also a
 515 universal, normal, mode of thought, wherein the constitutive fabric of the 'dream-thoughts' is dissolved into its
 516 raw material (Freud, 1900, 543). This material has been gathered and assembled from bits and pieces of input
 517 from all sensory modalities; it has rekindled emotions from early unrepresented memories, fitting and matching
 518 select features and qualities of these to current situations; it has found connections and forged new unities
 519 forming composite images; and it has sought parallels, similarities, comparisons, and analogies, pointing to
 520 dynamic patterns even before these have reached awareness.

521 "Dynamic schematization" (Werner & Kaplan, 1963) is the cerebral activity by means of which a sea of
 522 unorganized sensory, perceptual, affective, mnemonic and kinetic, stimuli are sorted, integrated, and funnelled
 523 into idiosyncratic new formulations. In our search for invariance we seek and find common features in the
 524 dynamic properties of interactions, events, and objects. Dreams gather together and pictorialize these
 525 subjectively woven ideas, seemingly knowing more than we do, having already distilled the essential features of
 526 a pattern subsuming past and current experiences. The 'motive force' for this sort of nocturnal cognition appears
 527 to be a need to give shape, to organize and represent, the polymorphous, ambiguous, richly nuanced *experiential*
 528 *qualities* of our inner world— just that. For every 'wish' they fulfil dreams labour to process and 'cognize' how
 529 we are to deal with the challenges in our lives.

530 A bio-semiotic continuum based on logical principles of symbolization accommodates such a transitional
 531 phase in a seamless progression that begins in our basic biological constitution and rises to representation
 532 through the nervous system's own responsiveness and semiotic activity. The mark of that threshold is the
 533 registration of impulse, emotion, perception, memory: and a mind predisposed to abstracting perceptions and
 534 condensing cognitions generates *forms*. Feelings beget perceptual *forms* that signify stimuli and experience:
 535 dream structure exhibits in *statu nascendi* elements of endopsychic morphic-sentience (Aragno, 2008)
 536 revealing how "gnosis" is *there*, carved out of perception, emotion, and memory, *prior to* conventional signs,
 537 and by what means, what forms of expressive configuration, this knowledge is articulated.

538 Clinical experience suggests that the dream is already a fairly organized stratum and that there are deeper
 539 organic morphological coagulants from which this 'presentational' semiosis originates. Are we justified,
 540 then, in positing a general semiotic-impulsion toward 'representation'? I believe that we are, and that the
 541 proto-semiotic processes involved in dream-formation *qua* "representation" generated the functional, formal,
 542 and structural, preconditions for the subsequent adoption and *use* of semiotic instruments and systems.

543 How we Listen: Psychoanalytic methodology is generated *by* three tightly interrelated processes; i) our
 544 attentional/listening stance; ii) a 'free-associative' speech form; and, iii) an interpretive-referential orientation
 545 toward *all* emergent unconscious meanings and phenomena. Clinical expertise is grounded in *experiential*
 546 *knowledge*: deep personal awareness and skill in conducting the analytic process. For meta-theoretical research,
 547 only an inquiry into our discourse semantic and procedural linguistic features, i.e., a *meta-analysis* of the
 548 discourse itself, yields overarching principles for how this method works.

549 Key features of this evenly suspended attentional stance are a methodological insistence on *finding* rather
 550 than *making* sense of something, allowing phenomena to speak for themselves; a strictly non-judgmental
 551 approach; an 'equidistant' position from multiple levels of interaction; and, *prerequisite*, a particular fine-tuned
 552 application of empathic attunement. Throughout life, empathy entails a momentary, involuntary de-
 553 differentiation of individual separateness. The specialized, technical application of this mode of apprehension in
 554 the analytic situation, however, is a highly mediated, controlled, richly referenced and *deliberate* type of
 555 empathy, balanced between participation and cognition, issuing from a fully differentiated position. This is not a

556 *sympathetic* stance. Empathic attunement in psychoanalytic discourse is a way of reaching to the heart of the
 557 *emotional* essence of another's experience. By breaching linguistic blocks it is also a means of establishing a
 558 mutually inter-penetrative dialectical nexus at the core of this "psychical field" (Freud, 1914,153). Never, in our
 559 discourse, is it an unmediated or undisciplined response.

560 Common empathy works by *feeling into* another's state but in our stance this is not limited to emotional-
 561 patterns. Psychoanalytic empathy employs intellect to resonate with meanings that issue from any kind of
 562 'pattern,' achieving *informational* value by combining conscious referencing through linguistic or *conceptual*
 563 correspondence with another's inner world without necessarily *participating* in their *feelings*. This is very
 564 important when considering empathy as an interpretive technique: for if its primitive roots originate in automatic
 565 mirroring and emotional-contagion, its uppermost branches reach sophisticated ideational forms that, thanks to
 566 language, are able to transcend separateness. Psychoanalytic empathy depends on *understanding* what the
 567 others' experience feels like and of having come to this by way of a synthesis of perceptual, sensory-emotive and
 568 ideational referents generated in one's self by the other. The bi-directionality of this process, mirroring the
 569 profoundly dialectical quality of our discourse, is contingent on the unimpeded flow of emotional signals passing
 570 through less differentiated channels of communication. Perhaps this is our window into early human
 571 communication.

572 Identifying and interpreting unconscious meanings requires a multipaletteted repertoire of perspectives and
 573 modes of attunement that orients toward different organizations of meaning and forms of transmission
 574 harnessing the totality of human responsiveness, as in resonance, connoting a disposition or, as I am using it, a
 575 *mode of understanding*. It is a type of listening that must be guided by the forms and functional organizations of
 576 the communications *themselves* and hence necessitates sensitivity to the full spectrum of human meanings. In
 577 particular two components of our discourse processes -- psychoanalytic empathy and 'working-through'— both
 578 involving *affects* (as do dreams), anchor our investigative interpretation of meanings, once again, in their
 579 biological soil.

580 The Situation: The relatively broad interpretive principles and procedural rules pertaining to our dialogue
 581 were designed to establish and maintain dynamic conditions maximizing therapeutic leverage while bringing
 582 into sharp relief; a) the experiential world of the analysand (in therapy); b) unconscious processes and
 583 phenomena (in research). The method sets in motion and heightens visibility of emergent phenomena which
 584 arise because of "the psychological situation in which the treatment places the patient"(1912,107). We call this
 585 dialogue the "psychoanalytic situation" and the events unfolding therein, the "analytic process". Yet the
 586 internally generated processes of this situation are *dialogical* phenomena, propelled and sustained by the
 587 referential perspectives and verbal transactions of this special conversation with unique goals. When these
 588 discourse features are subjected to an analysis we find that due to the proto-semiotic, non-indexical nature of
 589 many of its unconscious referents, this is a paradoxical discourse that defies and subverts language, going around
 590 or beneath it, attending to prosodic and frankly biological signals qualifying the verbal line in search of deeper
 591 meanings.

592 The analyst's mandate juxtaposes the speaker's intended meaning to the listener's interpretive slant so that
 593 what is heard and observed will always be *more* and *different* from what the speaker believes to have
 594 communicated. This creates a semantic field that disrupts dialogical expectations: it alters the scope of referents
 595 to encompass a widely divergent range of unconsciously communicated meanings generating an exploration that
 596 is constantly revising and amplifying itself through verbal renegotiations that denote, investigate, deepen, and
 597 reword everything unconscious that comes its way. By so amplifying the semantic field to include affect-states,
 598 paralinguistic signals and signs, projective-transmissions, as well as ambiguous or conflictual communications,
 599 psychoanalytic dialogues depend on a qualified observer who, like a mirror scanning the rear-view, can always
 600 see more of the unconscious dynamisms than can its embedded participant.

601 Discourse situations function in a circular manner: their semantic range and speech patterns establish joint
 602 referential perspectives signifying meanings that are subject to negotiation and reshaping according to evolving
 603 interpretive transactions. Communications and referential activities -- the pragmatics of discourse situations --
 604 thereby transform them to serve the dialogue's overriding situational goals; in our case to expand consciousness.
 605 This relationship between outer discourse and inner structuring is organic, mutually shaping, and reciprocally
 606 transforming, as the Bakhtinian (1981, 1986) landscape well illustrates.

607 With speech as the primary instrument, the many different uses to which language is put and different *types*
 608 of language-forms, come sharply into view; in particular, the figurative, descriptive, expressive, metaphoric, and
 609 conceptual. Each of these is indicative of different organic or cognitive states, different levels and types of
 610 semiotic organization, different cognitive styles, current dynamics and qualities of thought. Genuine insight
 611 resulting from having worked-through many archaic and defensive elements; that gives evidence of linking past

612 with present, affect with intellect, comes slowly, only after the complete analytic triad — identifying, naming
613 and working-through — has been repeated many times.

614 As the only instrument allowed speech becomes a heavily overdetermined psychobiological bridge in this
615 situation subsuming the expressive repertoire of an entire spectrum of communicative modalities ordinarily
616 spread among many organismic channels. For analysts it will take on many non- and pre-linguistic substitute
617 functions; at times talk is touch, contact, discharge, play; it can serve to attract or distance, communicate or
618 confuse, to reflect or deflect; ideally it will serve thought, self-observation, working-through and insight.
619 Virtually all of the considerable tensions aroused by this situation are funnelled exclusively through the vehicle
620 of speech. In this way, the externalization of ideation, regulation of action and affect, negotiation of response,
621 and mediation of the entire semantic field, is filtered through the muted and focused exercise of verbal, symbolic
622 activity. This is an ideal: but an important one. The psycho-cognitive instrumentation of our interpretive
623 semantic is implemented through the dialectic of its discourse processes, its insistence on verbal form: with
624 reference to the abstractive, secondary-process language of insight "we superimpose speech on speech" (Stone,
625 1960, 86).

626 In due course, what transpires within the situational space acquires all the characteristics of its domain of
627 reference, the Unconscious: the discourse grows timeless, non-linear, de-differentiated, regressive, illogical, full
628 of condensations, displacements, metaphors, projections, fantasies, dreams, introducing a cast of characters and
629 memories from every phase, walk, and aspect of life. Time, in the passing of the analytic hour, stands still, in an
630 ever current present that accommodates tellings moving in temporal circles, interspersing narration with
631 enactment, spiralling discontinuously around and around, again and again...the chain of repetition blunted only
632 by circumstances that modulate these experiences by reflection and working-through, the interpolation of
633 thought and language, those mediating guides that temper action and still the past with a grammatical turn of
634 tense.

635 The human psyche/mind germinates and develops within the dialectics of social interchange: its
636 developmental history and structural characteristics, likewise, emerge through a specialized discourse-method
637 that revives its most salient patterns. By advocating a *contextual* rather than a retrospective approach, Freud set
638 the stage for the scrupulous, uncontaminating use of the self as a methodological necessity. This new
639 interpenetrative epistemology utilizes human responsiveness, *in its totality*, as its instrument; we are the players
640 and the music. Devising a dialogical methodology that expands personal awareness as it implements a
641 transformation of consciousness invites us to turn the method back on itself and observe the means by which
642 mind develops itself: how the method works is tied to how we *inform* and are *transformed*.

643 A participatory epistemology requires that we approach all interactions according to their particular context-
644 dependent functional-form, their purpose and 'meaning,' in relation to the organic or semantic fields in which
645 they occur. This requires that we "sensitize our cognition" as Goodman (1984, 8) put it, to include what is
646 usually subliminal as important primary registers in discriminating various patterns of information, and that we
647 coin new vocabularies befitting the new forms thereby identified in their distinct modes of meaning-making.
648 With such a mandate we would factor in to all understanding the pivotal role of human responsiveness *in its*
649 *totality* as participatory in the investigative scheme. Having now become multiperspectival observers we would
650 embrace a "scientific philosophy" (109) of general forms as envisioned by Lord Russell (1914/1953) that
651 concerns itself with the "analysis and enumeration of logical forms, i.e., with the kinds of propositions that may
652 occur, with the various types of facts, and with the classification of the constituents of facts" (108).

653 Since we ourselves are the formulative agents we would adopt the most propitious methodologies for the
654 subjects and purposes at hand; and in this exercise the forms and phenomena *themselves will determine how we*
655 *are to understand them*. Needless to say, we would observe the investigative process itself as a means of
656 understanding how better to understand. In this sense, it is not so easy to disentangle epistemology from
657 psychology, science from art.

658 From the standpoint of such a grammar of logical forms, we would enter each investigative context equipped
659 with a dictionary for the vocabulary of the language in which those *significants* speak, making it our business to
660 amplify and enrich our fluency in that vocabulary as our familiarity with those forms increases. But little or
661 nothing at all is understood if we impose on our phenomena categories and grammars of another language, if we
662 confuse 'matter' of bricks and mortar with 'matters' of meanings and memories, failing to implement principles
663 of *pleroma* in distinction to those of *creatura*, wherever appropriate. 'Mind' materializes through formulation,
664 "We make a star as we make a constellation, by putting its parts together and marking off its boundaries"
665 (Goodman, 1984, 42). Words can make 'things' out of feelings, process, pattern, or structure, alike.
666
667

668 **Our Farthest Reach: A Marriage of Minds**

669 *The phenomena with which we are dealing do not belong to psychology alone; they have an*
 670 *organic and biological side as well, and accordingly in the course of our efforts at building up*
 671 *psycho-analysis we have also made some important biological discoveries*
 672 *and have not been able to avoid framing new biological hypotheses.*

673
 674 Freud, 1940, 195

675

676 The revisionist slant in finding the natural origins of human signification, or the morphology of human
 677 meanings, in our biological constitution, is what brought me to ‘Biosemiotics’ and what lies behind the
 678 engagement implicit in this paper. Though popularized by its success as ‘therapy,’ psychoanalysis was
 679 conceived by Freud as a scientific *methodology* to shed light on all unconscious manifestations: The deep
 680 unconscious *is* the biological substrate of ‘mental’ functioning. With the help of comprehensive
 681 interdisciplinarity in a contemporary unifying ‘interpenetrative’ paradigm launched by quantum physics, the
 682 marriage of psychoanalytic methodology and the biosemiotic agenda opens immense new possibilities for
 683 understanding animate fields and the *natural* basis for many hitherto inexplicable interactive and
 684 communicative phenomena.

685 Freud turned the eyes of the world inward, stretching the Hellenic dictum “know thyself” to new dark and
 686 unforeseeable depths. At the same time he opened the door to a new semantic that, due to its expanded range of
 687 organic, experiential referents, undermines the Cartesian split while adopting a more holistic metatheoretical
 688 base to encompass the full spectrum of bio-semiotic meanings accessed by its interpretive purview. Whether this
 689 takes us inward to the individual psyche, or outward to general forms, it is an approach committed to viewing the
 690 human whole, a somato-psychic unity, inevitably intertwined with other vital systems and all organic life.

691 As a research methodology psychoanalysis anticipated the protocols of Naturalistic Research by many
 692 years: as a therapeutic technique it expands our ability to know ourselves; as a theory of mind, psychoanalysis
 693 lays bare the operative progressions and logical principles of semiotic mediation along phylo-and ontogenetic
 694 lines (Aragno, 1997,2008, 2011). With all due respect, I believe we have been looking for the origins of
 695 language in the wrong places and that the missing link will fall into place once ‘science’ considers examining
 696 phenomena from which it still shrinks. Specifically, the serious methodological inclusion of emotive-cognition
 697 (as pictured in dreams and instrumentalized in psychoanalytic empathy) as a source of important information,
 698 may lead to major inroads in tracing the origins of communication.

699 The practical implementation of an *interpenetrative epistemology*, as I see it, opens the door to the possibility
 700 of developing a general theory of signification built on holistic bio-semiotic principles of mind-in body, mind-*as*
 701 -body, pulling together, under one system of ideas, phenomena that originate in deep, micro-organic biochemical
 702 exchanges, pass through ‘iconic/psychical’ phase, proceeding to linguistic articulation and on to conscious
 703 awareness through semantic and discourse reference. In this sense, our expanded dialogue propelling new
 704 consciousness becomes a natural “lab” where coevolutionary, organic speech activities may be studied *in vivo*.

705 Within the hierarchic epigenetic continuum proposed above I would be looking for integrative plains, new
 706 levels of organization, as markers, each increasingly condensed level achieved by reaching thresholds from a
 707 previous phase no longer efficiently fostering adaption or growth. And I would be looking for an ascending
 708 recurrence of isomorphic templates, all the way up the evolutionary scale and biosemiotic continuum, in the
 709 belief that natural processes are more likely to be continuous than discontinuous. My competence in this,
 710 however, is limited to what I know of “mind” and requires the complementary knowledge of bio-molecular
 711 expertise. The task, as Langer (1967) described it, is the “—construction of a biological concept of mind
 712 adequate to the phenomenon itself—” (74).

713 I was ushered into Biosemiotics by a savvy match-maker; at a first encounter shy, a hesitant ‘outsider,’
 714 despite the natural convergence of ideas. Two years of readings familiarizing myself with the parentage and
 715 current generational voices of this new field embolden me in my second meeting, and I am prepared to make the
 716 engagement formal. My interests sharpened, I seek to learn from and contribute to this new science to which I
 717 am betrothed; the prospects look good because the fit is already there, the attraction inherent. Bringing with me a
 718 methodology marginalized for lack of a legitimizing scientific framework, it is more than fortuitous to meet up
 719 with a science in search of a methodology! The progeny of such a marriage promise to bring out the best of both
 720 fields and cannot but yield new horizons of unity and knowledge.

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- 768